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Abstract
In this article we study the implication of thresholds in preferences. To model
this we extend the basic model of John and Pecchenino (1994) by allowing the cur-
rent level of environmental quality to have a discrete impact on how an agent trades
off future consumption and environmental quality. In other words, we endogenize
the semi-elasticity of utility based on a step function. We motivate the existence
of the threshold based on research from political science, from arguments based on
regulation and standards, cultural economics as well as ecological economics.
Our results are that the location of the threshold determines both the potential
steady states as well as the dynamics. For low (high) thresholds, environmental
quality converges to a low (high) steady state. For intermediate levels it converges
to a stable p-cycle, with environmental quality being asymptotically bounded below
and above by the low and high steady state. We discuss implications for intergen-
erational equity and policy making.
As policy implications we study shifts in the threshold. Our results are that, in
case it is costless to shift the threshold, it is always worthwhile to do so. If it is
costly to change the threshold, then it is worthwhile to change the threshold if the
threshold originally was sufficiently low. Lump-sum taxes may lead to a develop-
ment trap and should be avoided if there are uncertainties about the threshold or
the effectiveness of the policy.
JEL classification: Q28, Q56.
Keywords: thresholds, endogenous preferences, environmental quality, policy inter-
vention.
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1 Introduction
It is public opinion that drives governments’ actions, decisions, laws, changes the politi-
cal agenda and sometimes even its direction. But public opinion tends to be sticky and
requires enough pressing issues for it to change. However, if sufficiently pressing prob-
lems are identified, then preferences undertake radical changes. This has been observed
to be especially true for concerns directed to the environment. In this respect, Ersk-
ine (1972) noticed that “[a] miracle of public opinion has been the unprecedented speed
and urgency with which ecological issues have burst into American consciousness.” She
then continues by saying that “[t]he environment does approach top priority today for
expanded governmental spending in the opinion of the citizenry.” In this article we model
this radical change in the preferences and study its effects. To do so, we introduce the
idea of threshold preferences to investigate the impact of discrete changes to preference on
the trade-off between consumption and the environment. In other words, we endogenize
the semi-elasticity1 of utility based on a step function.2 Specifically, we suggest that if
environmental quality is below a threshold then this increases agents’ semi-elasticity of
environmental quality in utility. In contrast, if agents are faced with a state of abundant
environmental quality above that threshold, then their preferences are directed relatively
less towards the environment, in the sense that the agent’s semi-elasticity of environmental
quality in utility will be low. In other words, we suggest that the current level of environ-
mental quality has a discrete impact on how an agent trades off future consumption and
future environmental quality.
The point that we develop here is that preferences should be viewed as being endoge-
nous, but changes to the preferences require sufficiently strong impulses. Consequently,
the model that we propose here has some relation to the class of models based upon
lexicographical preferences (Sen (1970); Gelso and Peterson (2005)). Lexiographical pref-
erences are an interesting modeling approach since they allow to deal with the crossing
1The semi-elasticity of a function f(x) is defined as f ′(x)x.
2Prieur and Bre´chet (2013) endogenize the semi-elasticity of utility via education expenditure, while
Goulao and Pe´rez-Barahona (2013) endogenize it via health capital.
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of thresholds that are tacitly important for a society. This is relevant especially for the
environmental domain. Specifically, actions devoted to environmental protection tend to
be undertaken when situations are dire or pressing enough. As an example, the Cuya-
hoga River in the USA was so polluted that it caught fire several times. In consequence
of this extreme pollution the Environmental Protection Agency was established, as well
as a multitude of water quality regulations.
Our modeling approach is based upon the overlapping generations model of consump-
tion and the environment by John and Pecchenino (1994). We extend their work by
introducing the idea of threshold preferences3. As we shall show, our model of threshold
preferences has further effects than a mere acceleration one. Crucially, the position of
the threshold determines the dynamics and implications of this model. We show that for
sufficiently high threshold levels, which would, for example, be the case for an ecologically-
oriented society, our model predicts that this society will grow monotonically towards a
high level of environmental quality. Instead, societies will be likely to converge to a low
level of environmental quality if they only place priority on the environment in dire sit-
uations. This would be the case if the threshold is sufficiently low. However, for mixed
societies, namely those that are in neither of these two extreme cases, we find that en-
vironmental quality will not converge to any steady state. Instead, when environmental
quality is bad, then their preferences will be directed relatively more towards environ-
mental quality, and consequently the state of the environment will improve. Once it has
improved sufficiently (i.e. crossed the threshold), then the society’s preference will shift
back towards a more consumption-oriented one, implying less effort directed towards the
environment. This will therefore induce a never-ending cycle. One could say this occurs
simply because societies in this case are not sufficiently far-sighted and their reference
point of environmental quality, or their status quo, essentially only depends on today’s
environmental quality. Or, in a slightly different interpretation, society’s preferences lack
sufficient consistency in a sense that they are too easily shifted by a reference point.
Though we take a black-box approach to the threshold in the model, we provide several
3We came across this idea due to an article by Goulao and Pe´rez-Barahona (2013).
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ways in which the underlying mechanics can be derived. To do so, we freely borrow from
previous works in political science, regulation and standards, cultural economics as well as
ecological economics. These approaches do not provide a full-fledged micro-foundation for
our threshold, but they can nevertheless help in supporting our reduced-form threshold
model based on existing research from different fields.
We also show that there is a certain complementarity between the environmental qual-
ity that an individual or a society faces today, and the one that he or she is confronted with
in the future. Thus, in a sense, our article borrows from the literature on intertemporally-
dependent preferences (Ryder and Heal (1973), Wan (1970)). Specifically, in our context
this means that environmental quality today impacts how the individual or society values
future environmental quality, and thereby affects the trade-offs between polluting and
abating behavior. In this respect, an approach that is related to ours is the one presented
in Schumacher and Zou (2008). In that article we pursue the idea that agents perceive
the state of environmental quality not based on the actual level, but with reference to the
status quo. In other words, agents cannot fully relate to the environment as it was before
they were born, and are thus more strongly concerned with changes in the environment
than with the level itself. The main result in that article is that, for a large set of pa-
rameters, the model would generate complex dynamics which would lead to violations of
standard criteria of intergenerational equity. In the current work we introduce a different
yet complementary approach by suggesting that changes to the preferences only occur
once a certain threshold has been crossed. The implication of this threshold is again
that cycles are possible and therefore standard criteria of intergenerational equity will be
violated, but the underlying reasons are different. In Schumacher and Zou (2008) cycles
occurred because agents got habituated to pollution, while in the current approach agents
change their preferences if society feels sufficient environmental pressure.
Our work also links to the article by Prieur and Bre´chet (2013) as well as Goulao
and Pe´rez-Barahona (2013). In Prieur and Bre´chet (2013), the authors endogenize the
semi-elasticity of environmental quality via human capital, and call this expenditure in
environmental awareness. They study whether education in environmental awareness
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may lead to sustained growth, or induce society to converge to a steady state. These
authors show that, if environmental awareness is sufficiently sensitive to human capital,
then society may not converge to the sustained growth equilibrium any longer but only
to the steady state. Thus, the authors show how an endogenous environmental awareness
can lead to a qualitative change in the dynamics. However, they obtain this by allowing
for a balanced growth path, while we solely focus on a steady state economy. Also, we
obtain much richer dynamics, and focus on a different source of endogeneity. In the
article Goulao and Pe´rez-Barahona (2013) the authors also endogenize the semi-elasticity
of utility, but this time they study the impact of health capital on survival probabilities.
The main mechanism in common with us is the authors’ focus on a step-function. For
high health capital, the semi-elasticity (probability of survival) of health in utility is high,
while for low health capital this semi-elasticity takes a low value. These authors also find
the existence of two stable steady states in their case. In contrast, our dynamics are much
richer, and the reason for this is that, in our case, the endogenous feedbacks are more
complex.
Our work also links to the class of endogenous preferences (Bowles (1998)) and cultural
traits (Bisin and Verdier (2001)), even though we neither explicitly model the underlying
cultural dynamics nor group heterogeneity. However, we show how a simple model of
endogenous cultural traits can result in the type of utility function that we use in our
model. This approach is in line with Schumacher (2009). In contrast to our current work,
the modeling approach in Schumacher (2009) lacked an endogenous, explicit dynamic
choice mechanism. In this article we present one way in which this choice mechanism can
be modeled. While the results in Schumacher (2009) are based on an implicit decision
progress, those presented here are based on an explicit, dynamic one.
Our results are that the location of the threshold determines both the potential steady
states as well as the dynamics. For low (high) thresholds, environmental quality converges
to a low (high) steady state. For intermediate levels it converges to a stable p-cycle, with
environmental quality being asymptotically bounded below and above by the low and high
steady state. We discuss implications for intergenerational equity and policy making. As
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policy implications we study shifts in the threshold. Our results are that, in case it is
costless to shift the threshold, it is always worthwhile to do so. If it is costly to change
the threshold, then it is worthwhile to change the threshold if the threshold originally was
sufficiently low. Lump-sum taxes may lead to a development trap and should be avoided
if there are uncertainties about the threshold or the effectiveness of the policy.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we motivate our model through relying
on studies from political science, from cultural economics, and ecological economics. We
show how each of these disciplines can imply the extension to the utility function that
we introduce here. Section 3 introduces the model and studies its dynamics and steady
state properties. Here we also discuss the results and relate it to John and Pecchenino
(1994) and Schumacher (2009). In section 4 we discuss lessons for intergenerational equity
and under what circumstances the model predicts convergence to a disastrous level of
environmental quality. We look into possible policies in section 5. In section 6 we conclude.
2 Background
In this part we borrow extensively from different disciplines in order to give a foundation
to the model extension of John and Pecchenino (1994) that we propose in the next sec-
tion. Those disciplines are political science, regulation and standards, cultural economics
and ecological economics. We review how some approaches or results of the established
literature can be viewed within our setting as outlined above.
2.1 Political science
Downs (1972) describes the “issue-attention cycle”, which proceeds in five stages. In
stage 1, which he calls “the pre-problem stage”, some undesirable social condition exists
without being fully incorporated into the public opinion. In stage 2, dubbed the stage of
“alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm”, a drastic worsening of the social condition
leads to an euphoric public that wants to take care of the problem. His third stage, the
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“realizing the cost of significant progress” stage, is then followed by the stage of “gradual
decline of intense public interest” followed by a so-called “post-problem” stage. In this
fifth stage, potentially new institutions or laws that were originally designed to treat the
social condition continue to exist and may still have some impact.
In other words, a slowly deteriorating (environmental) condition may be unnoticed
by the general public unless a certain threshold is crossed, or a drastic worsening of the
situation calls for public attention. In that case preferences get strongly directed towards
this problem. Whether the third stage turns out to be an important driver of continuous
public interest is certainly depending on the situation at hand. However, what Downs
(1972) seems to say is that this public attention gets directed to an immediate problem,
and for some reason fades away again after some while. This may be, as Downs suggests,
because costs are too high, but it may also be because the problem has been resolved
to a sufficient extent. What this suggests, nevertheless, is that there is a point at which
attention gets directed towards a problem, while attention is directed elsewhere if the
problem cannot be resolved or is taken care of. Thus, this may lead to never-ending cycles
of issue-attention. We now provide two examples for this issue-attention cycle, followed
by a small model that may explain how voters’ preferences transcendent into government
preferences and thereby induce a threshold effect that may lead to the issue-attention
cycle.
Example 1. As an example from financial economics we propose the Glass-Steagall
Act, which nicely fits the issue-attention cycle. In order to separate commercial banking
and investment banking, the union of which was believed to be one source of the 1929
financial crisis, the Glass-Steagall Act was passed in the US in 1933. In Kennedy’s (1973)
opinion, this bill came about only due to strong public pressure after the crisis. In 1999,
President Clinton decided to suspend the Act, allowing commercial banks and investment
banks to re-unite. Only ten years later, as a consequence of the 2008 financial crisis,
public opinion is demanding a move back to ‘narrow banking’, which would basically
imply the re-introduction of a version of the Glass-Steagal Act. What we thus see here
is that a certain threshold needs to be crossed before public attention gets mobilized. In
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the present example this threshold is given by the discrete move from a non-crisis to a
crisis situation.4
Example 2. Another example comes directly from politics. In the aftermath of
Fukushima, 2011, the CDU, the ruling party in Germany at that time, decided to shut
down most atomic power plants in Germany. This decision reflected a complete turn-
around in this party’s attitude to atomic power, since just a few years before they repealed
a law that required several German atomic power plants to shut down. Consequently, this
extreme event led to a 180-degree turnaround in policy.
We present a simple model that provides one way to justify the approach taken in
the next section. Let us assume that utility takes the form vi = θi log(Eo + E) − E.
Here, utility is increasing in the public good Eo + E, where Eo is the current level of
environmental quality, but there is a unit cost that each individual needs to bear in order
to increase E. Preferences θi are distributed over θi ∈ [θmin, θmax]. Individual i will
vote for an increase in the public good E if θi > Eo + E. The government adopts the
preferences of the median voter, which are given by θm = Eo + E. Thus, for Eo > θmax,
the government will have preference type θmin, while for θmin ≥ Eo, the government’s
type will be θm > θmin. As a consequence, the current level of environmental quality
affects the preferences that the government adopts. If the initial environmental quality
is sufficiently high, then the preferences of the policy maker will include environmental
quality only marginally, while for low levels of environmental quality, these preferences
will be more strongly directed towards environmental quality. This, thus, may explain
why thresholds in the utility function, here a policy maker’s, may occur.
2.2 Regulations and standards
The government has several methods to address environmental problems. Apart from
economic incentives like taxes, subsidies or cap-and-trade, the policy maker can also
4The resulting regulation-deregulation cycle has been shown to exist in an empirical study by Lee and
Schumacher (2011). This article shows that mainly crises lead to changes in attitude and thus regulation,
while the authors find that in times of stability attitudes turn around and induce de-regulations.
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provide prescriptive controls, like technology standards (e.g. best available technology),
performance standards, emission or ambient standards, which are more of the command-
and-control type. The standards are then based on some analyzes like cost-benefit studies,
precautionary principles, health objectives or simply a policy target. This is laid out e.g.
in Section 108 of the Clean Air Act demanding that “[a]ir quality criteria for an air
pollutant shall accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the
kind and extent of all identifiable effects on public health or welfare which may be expected
from the presence of such pollutant in the ambient air, in varying quantities.” Based on
these criteria and health considerations, article 5 (b) of the EU Directive 2001/81/EC
requires that, in member states, “the ground-level ozone load shall not exceed an absolute
limit of 2.9 ppm.h in any grid cell.” In case a pollution threshold is violated, then article 19
of the EU Directive 2008/50/EC demands that “Member States shall take the necessary
steps to inform the public by means of radio, television, newspapers or the Internet.”
This leads to the common belief that, after a standard has been imposed, any pollution
level above the standard is safe and fine, while any pollution level below the standard is
worrisome and needs to be addressed. As a result, this leads to a threshold effect.5
It is certainly unreasonable to belief that any level of pollution above the standard
is safe while any level of pollution below the standard requires immediate policy action.
In reality, health effects are more likely to be depending on the level of pollution in a
continuous way. Nevertheless, the simple fact that a standard is imposed leads to inaction
for pollution levels above the standard and action below the standard.
If one were to model this, then in a slightly generalized way one could say that the
individual’s utility function depends on the threshold. For environmental quality above
the threshold, the individual has little attention directed towards environment quality,
or obtains a low marginal utility from environmental quality, while for environmental
5Standards are not always applicable, as the EU Directive 2008/50/EC suggests: “Fine particulate
matter (PM2,5) is responsible for significant negative impacts on human health. Further, there is as yet
no identifiable threshold below which PM2,5 would not pose a risk. As such, this pollutant should not be
regulated in the same way as other air pollutants.” In these cases, depending on the way the pollutant
is finally regulated, threshold effects may or may not occur.
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quality below the threshold the individual concern increases with a discrete step, and the
individual obtains a high marginal utility from environmental quality. We model this
mechanism in the next section.
2.3 Cultural economics
Cultural economics plays an increasing role for modeling endogenous preferences. Espe-
cially for environmental problems, this approach promises to be useful. In this respect,
Linton (1963 (1940 reprint)) notes that (p. 466) “... [c]ultures are adaptive mechanisms
and as such represent a response to the needs of our species.” Empirical evidence suggests
that cultural influences cannot anymore be neglected by economists. For example, Grau-
mann and Kruse (1990) conclude that social relations form attitudes and values. More
specifically, Villacorta et al. (2003) find that children’s environmental self-regulation is
influenced by their parents’ self-regulation. Also, Olli et al. (2001), relying on a Norwe-
gian social survey, conclude that the social network drives environmental behavior. Thus,
preferences should be viewed as being endogenous and culture seems to play a crucial
role.
We now present a simple cultural dynamics mechanism that can explain the modelling
approach of the preferences that we use in the next section. This mechanism is developed
and studied in Schumacher (2009) and derives from the cultural dynamics introduced in
Bisin and Verdier (1998) and (2001). Preferences are ordered over θt ∈ [0, 1], t = 1, 2, ...,
with θt = 0 denoting brown ones and θt = 1 implying green ones. We assume that the
children adapt their preferences either from their green (brown) parents with a probability
q ∈ (0, 1), or are influenced by someone with either of the two preference traits. The
probability q(E) takes the form q′(E) < 0, meaning that the larger is environmental
quality E the lower is the probability to adapt green preferences. A child born by brown
parents keeps the brown preference trait with probability q¯. As a consequence, children
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change their preferences based on this reduced-form equation6
θ˙t = θt(1− θt)(q(E)− q¯). (1)
There are three potential equilibrium points, given by θ = 0, θ = 1, and q(E) = q¯. If
q(E) > q¯ then we converge to θ = 1, while for q(E) < q¯ we converge to q = 0. Assume
that there are no immediate feedbacks from θ to E, then this implies that only θ = 1 and
θ = 0 are asymptotically stable. Thus, we end up with a utility function that, depending
on the level of environmental quality, is either green or brown. The threshold at which
this discrete change occurs is where E = q−1(q¯). We thus may conclude that cultural
dynamics can give rise to thresholds in the utility function.
2.4 Ecological Economics
As much of the literature in Ecological Economics has pointed out, monetary values are
but one aspect of environmental values (Lockwood (1996); Gowdy (1997); Splash (2000)).
Other factors like ethical concerns, basic needs, or culture-specific wants led many eco-
logical economists to the conclusion that lexicographical preferences should supersede the
neoclassical paradigm. Popularized by Georgescu-Roegen (1954), these lexicographical
preferences imply that substitution between inputs in the utility function is impossible
since they give an absolute priority to one good over another. For example, the protection
of the habitat of endangered species often receives absolute priority over economic devel-
opments of that area. Similarly, once a species is in danger of extinction, then substantial
efforts will be undertaken to prevent this from happening.
Indeed, there is now ample empirical evidence supporting the existence of lexicograph-
ical preferences. For example, Stevens et al. (1991) found that around a quarter of the
individuals in their US study about wildlife preservation hold lexicographical preferences.
A similar percentage has been identified as holders of lexicographical preferences in a
survey on wetlands preservation by Spash (2000). In an experiment on improvements
6The derivation of this equation can be found in Schumacher (2009).
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of rural landscape attributes, Campbell et al. (2008) find that discontinuous preferences
help explain the magnitude and robustness of willingness to pay estimates.
We build upon these empirical approaches and in what follows, we shall adapt a type
of lexicographical preferences, but to a limited degree. Instead, what we want to do is
to add a lexicographical flavor to the standard neoclassical modeling structure. Figure 1
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Figure 1: Effect of θH and θL
shows what we have in mind. Assume we have a situation where Et > Ê. Thus, current
environmental quality Et is above a certain threshold Ê. In this case the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and environmental quality will, for a given budget
constraint, induce society to choose the optimal bundle {C1, E1}. However, assume now
that - still given the same budget constraint and the same level of environmental quality,
the threshold Ê were to be lower. In this case society would give a heightened, near
absolute, priority to the environment over consumption, which would be reflected by a
change in the marginal rate of substitution. In this case society would be inclined to
choose bundle {C2, E2}, where C1 > C2 but E1 < E2.
A utility function that could take this threshold event into account would have a
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discontinuity at the point of threshold. This discontinuity would lay the foundation for
behaving in a certain way with a lexicographical preference order. For example, in its
most extreme form, environmental quality would not figure as a driver of decisions in
case there is a sufficient level of environmental quality around. However, once a threshold
is passed, attention is diverted to the evolution of the environment and environmental
quality starts to figure in the decision-taking process.
3 The model
In this model we consider an overlapping generations economy with an indeterminate
horizon t = 0, 1, 2.... We abstract from uncertainty by assuming perfect foresight and
also from incomplete markets by taking them as perfectly competitive. Population is
assumed to be constant and each generation consists of a single representative individual.
A generation lives for two periods, young and old. The young generations have an inelastic
labor supply and either save or invest in abatement. The old generations obtain utility
from consuming their savings and from the state of the environment. So far, this model
follows John and Pecchenino (1994). Our extension, as motived in the previous section, is
to introduce a threshold in environmental quality. If environmental quality is above that
threshold, then agents care relatively little about the environment, while if it is below that
threshold, then preferences get directed towards environmental quality. Our intention is
to study the impact of this threshold on the equilibria of the model and the dynamics.
3.1 The environment
We assume that the evolution of environmental quality Et is described by
Et+1 = Et − βct + γAt, (2)
where β > 0 is a parameters of consumption externality and represents the rate at which
a unit of consumption ct pollutes the environment, while γ > 0 represents the strength
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at which the abatement effort At improves environmental quality. Hence, the stock of
tomorrow’s environment is depending on today’s stock of the environment and is being
reduced by consumption and improved through abatement.7 One deviation in this law of
motion for environment from the original model of John and Pecchenino (1994) is that we
assume away a natural regeneration rate. As a consequence, our model is applicable to
cases where the environment cannot improve its natural state itself. This is, for example,
a reasonable assumption for shallow lakes or irreversibility like soil erosion or climate
change.
We also assume that Et+i = 0, ∀i ≥ 1, if Et − βct + γAt ≤ 0. Consequently, once
environmental quality has degenerated to its lowest level, then it cannot be improved
again. We call E = 0 the ‘Point of Destruction’. Basically, we assume that life on earth
would be impossible when environmental quality reaches the zero lower bound. In section
4 we discuss under what circumstances we may approach the Point of Destruction.
3.2 The agents
Agents receive a wage wt which they either save st or use for abatement At. They earn
an interest Rt+1 > 1 on their savings st and consume from this ct+1. Thus their budget
constraints are wt = st + At, and ct+1 = Rt+1st. Agents derive utility over consumption
and environmental quality in period t + 1 only. However, as motivated in the previous
section, their marginal utility of environmental quality when old depends on the level of
7We could have also followed Jouvet et al. (2005) by assuming that the evolution of environmental
quality is described by
Et+1 = E˜ +m(Et − E˜)− βct + γAt,
where m ∈ (0, 1) is the speed at which the environment returns to its natural state E˜ > 0. This equation
for environmental quality would have the advantage that it allows to keep track of the position of the
environment relative to its natural state, to which it would always return in the absence of human
intervention. It effectively is a linearized version of the Verhulst equation. However, apart from being
able to describe the position of the environment relative to its natural state, this formulation would add
little substance to our framework but complicate the theoretical analysis substantially. We will discuss
one implication of this law of motion in section 4.
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environmental quality when young. In other words, we endogenize the semi-elasticity of
utility based on a step function. Specifically, it depends on the level of environmental
quality relative to the threshold that changes their preferences. For simplicity we assume
that utility is logarithmic and takes the form
U(ct+1, Et+1, θt) = ln ct+1 + θt lnEt+1, (3)
where θt ≥ 0 measures the relative preference of the generations for the environment over
consumption. Thus, θt is also the semi-elasticity of environmental quality in utility. We
now define the effect of the threshold.
Assumption 1 Assume that there exists a threshold, defined as Ê > 0, then ∀Et < Ê
we have θt = θH . Furthermore, ∀Et ≥ Ê we have θt = θL. We assume that θH > θL > 0.
Consequently, Ê is the threshold level of environmental quality that induces a change in
the generations’ preferences. If a young generation is faced with a level of environmental
quality which is below that threshold, then its preferences will be more strongly directed
towards environmental quality than that of a young generation that faces a level of the
environment which is above that threshold.8 Various motivations underlying the existence
of this threshold have been given in the previous section.
3.3 Solving the model
The agents’ problem is to maximize the utility function subject to the two budget con-
straints and environmental quality. Our approach for solving this model is to derive
the first-order condition, show optimality, solve for the resulting equilibria and discuss
convergence. Comparative statics complete the analysis.
Maximizing equation (3) subject to the budget constraints and equation (2) leads to
Rt+1Et+1 = γθtct+1, (4)
8In consequence, the correct terminology for our time-varying preferences is that preferences are
predetermined.
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where, depending on the previous state of environmental quality, the endogenous evolution
of the preferences follows: θt = θL if Et ≤ Ê and θt = θH if Et < Ê.
This first-order condition in equation (4) implies that the marginal benefit of saving
one more unit wealth, and thus enjoying a larger consumption level when old, should
be equal to the marginal cost of facing a lower environmental quality. Slightly re-writing
equation (4) gives the condition Et−βct+γAt = θtγ(wt−At). We can see that increasing
abatement by one unit improves environmental quality by γ units. The cost of this is
given by the reductions in savings which are valued by θtγ. The main difference here to
the framework of John and Pecchenino is the existence of a threshold that leads to a time-
varying θ which induces discrete changes to the optimal solution in case the threshold is
crossed.
The second-order condition is
− 1
st
− γ2 θt
E2t+1
< 0. (5)
As a consequence, we know that our maximization problem fulfills the sufficient condition
for optimality.
The assumptions and conditions above lead to the temporal equilibrium. It is defined
as follows.
Definition 1 The temporal equilibrium consists of the allocations {wt, Rt, kt, ct, st, At, Et},
where at t = 0, 1, 2, ... firms maximize profits; labor and good markets clear; agents maxi-
mize (3) subject to their budget constraints wt = st + At and ct+1 = Rt+1st and equation
(2); net profits are distributed to the capital owners such that Rt = f
′(kt).
We now assume that the savings at time t of the young generation are used for produc-
tion and thus become the capital stock at t+1, st = kt+1. This leads to ct+1 = Rt+1kt+1 and
wt − kt+1 = At. Following the literature we suggest the standard Cobb-Douglas function
as an explicit functional form for the production function, implying that f(k) = kα, with
α ∈ (0, 1). Like de La Croix and Michel (2002) we assume that capital fully depreciates
during the course of one generation.
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As a consequence, equation (4) simplifies to
Et = γθt−1kt. (6)
Therefore, environmental quality will be proportional to the capital stock, where the factor
of proportionality is given by γθt. The factor of proportionality depends on whether Et−1
is smaller or larger than the threshold Ê. If Et−1 < Ê, then the factor of proportionality is
θHγ, while for Et−1 > Ê, then the factor of proportionality is θLγ. Thus, for a low level of
environmental quality when young, the agent will have preferences that are more strongly
directed towards environmental quality and a larger share of wages will be spent on
abatement. As a consequence, the ratio of environmental quality to capital will be larger
for those old generations that have started off with a relatively low level of environmental
quality.
Combining and solving the above equations gives the dynamic system that gives the
intertemporal equilibrium, which can be fully described by
Et+1 =
θt
1 + θt
[
Et + ((1− α)γ − αβ)
(
Et
γθt−1
)α]
, (7)
≡ H(Et, θt−1, θt),
and where we have the threshold condition θt = θL if Et ≤ Ê and θt = θH if Et < Ê.
This allows us now to define the intertemporal equilibrium.
Definition 2 Given k0 and E0, an intertemporal equilibrium is a temporal equilibrium
that, for all t ≥ 0, satisfies the capital accumulation condition st = kt+1 as well as equation
(7).
Our focus is on studying and describing this intertemporal equilibrium. This will be
complicated insofar as function H(Et, θt−1, θt) is subject to discrete changes whenever
environmental quality crosses the threshold Ê. Function H is a strictly increasing concave
function in Et if κ ≡ (1−α)γ−αβγα > 0.
In consequence, the evolution of Et depends on both the returns to abatement relative
to the polluting effect of consumption, the share of wealth directed towards abatement, as
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well as the level of Et relative to the threshold. If κ > 0, then the effective share of wealth
spent on abatement ((1 − α)γ) offsets the emissions created from allocating a share of
wealth to consumption (αβ). We call this the ‘strong abatement’ case. Mathematically
we get that H(Et, θt−1, θt) is a monotonically increasing function in Et if κ > 0. The
intuition is that in the case of strong abatement, increases to capital have a positive
net effect on environmental quality, as the abatement effort always offsets the emissions.
Thus, increases in wealth also lead to improvements in the environment.
In the case of ‘too dirty consumption’, i.e. when κ < 0, the abatement efforts are too
small to be able to offset the emissions. Consequently, the term ((1−α)γ−αβ)
(
Et
θt−1γ
)α
has a negative impact on future environmental quality. Since it describes the net effect of
abatement versus emissions, then this implies that the current and future environmental
stocks are essentially related through a negative feedback loop. We will treat the ‘too
dirty consumption’ case, i.e. κ < 0, more fully in section 4.9 For κ < 0, we have that
H(Et, θt−1, θt) < Et. Thus, if κ < 0 then Et+1 < Et and we will converge to the Point of
Destruction.
For now, we shall only focus on the more involved case of κ > 0.
Assumption 2 We assume that κ ≡ (1−α)γ−αβ
γα
> 0.
Thus, henceforth, we deal with the case where the effective share of income dedicated to
abatement outweighs the effective share of income that is polluting.
3.4 Steady state and dynamics
For the analysis of the steady state and the dynamics it is sufficient to focus on equation
(7). There will be essentially three different regimes. We pick up the two simple regimes
first. Assuming that environmental quality over time does not change and simplifying
leads to
Ei = θiκ
1
1−α , (8)
9For simplicity we neglect the case of κ = 0, since it is a degenerate parameter combination.
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for i = L,H, where θi = θL if EL > Ê, while θi = θH if EH < Ê. Since θL < θH , we also
know that EL < EH . Thus we can distinguish the first two regimes.
Case I (low threshold): Ê < EL < EH. By intuition, we would expect the
following. Let us assume that only very low levels of environmental quality induce a
change in the preferences. A society fixated on consumption or a country with a currently
low level of environmental awareness (c.f. Prieur and Bre´chet 2013) could fit this profile.
In this case one could argue that a society like this would not be willing to invest a large
share of income in the environment unless environmental quality becomes painfully low.
In other words, this would, for example, be the case for a society that is strongly detached
from the environment and only includes the externality environment in its decision-taking
progress when survival is at stake. In the case where environmental quality is below this
threshold where the society’s concern for the environment becomes important, then this
society will invest strongly in environmental quality. However, in the moment that the
society feels out of danger, i.e. the preference threshold is crossed, then the preferences
will return to a point where little importance is given to the environment. As long as
some abatement effort is undertaken, meaning as long as that society wants to avoid the
Point of Destruction, environmental quality will converge to a small but positive level.
We summarize this intuition in the following proposition and prove it analytically.
Proposition 1 Suppose Ê < θLκ
1
1−α < θHκ
1
1−α , then there exists a unique asymptotic
stable positive steady state, which is given by EL = θLκ
1
1−α .
Proof 1 In this case, either there exits some t0 > 0, such that, for all t > t0, Et < Ê, or
for t > t0, Et > Ê.
If Et < Ê, we must have θt = θH by assumption. Therefore, the dynamic equation is
Et+1 =
θH
1 + θH
(
Et +
κ
θαH
Eαt
)
.
Thus, the steady state, if it were to exist, would have to satisfy
κ
1
1−α θH = EH .
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However, this leads to a contradiction, since by assumption Ê < EL and EL < EH .
Therefore, there exists a t0 > 0, such that for t > t0, Et > Ê and hence, θt = θL. From
the dynamic equation
Et+1 =
θL
1 + θL
(
Et +
κ
θαL
Eαt
)
,
we thus obtain the unique positive steady state given by EL = θLκ
1
1−α .
Convergence to EL can be proven as follows. From the dynamic equation Et+1 =
θL
1+θL
(
Et +
κ
θαL
Eαt
)
, we have that Et+1 < Et if Et > θLκ
1−α. Since EL = θLκ1−α then
this implies that Et+1 < Et for Et > EL. A similar argument implies that Et+1 > Et for
Et < EL. We thus proved convergence to EL from above and below. 
We now turn to our second case.
Case II (high threshold): EL < EH < Ê. This condition can be expected to be
fulfilled in a society in which the environment plays an important part of people’s lives.
For example, a society that has strong moral norms directed towards the global good,
or one that has a more holistic approach to life. This would be the case of many earlier
societies which were trying to live with the environment instead of purely benefiting from
it. In this case the society will keep the high preference towards the environment for
normal (i.e. those for which Et < Ê) levels of the environment. Thus, it can be expected
that a society with preferences that are more strongly directed to the environment will
also prefer to live in a world with a higher level of environmental quality.10 We summarize
this case in the following proposition, which can apply a similar argument as case I.
Proposition 2 Suppose θLκ
1
1−α < θHκ
1
1−α < Ê, then the dynamic system converges to a
unique asymptotic stable positive steady state, given by EH = θHκ
1
1−α .
Proof 2 The proof is similar to Case I. 
10In the extreme case of Ê =∞, the society will never change its preferences and always consider the
environment as relatively important for utility.
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These two cases, the low threshold and the high threshold one, essentially lead to
the a unique globally asymptotically stable equilibrium as it is the case with the original
John and Pecchenino model without changing preferences. However, a crucial role is still
played by the position of the threshold relative to the potential steady states. We clearly
showed that societies that generally live in a benign state of environmental neglect will
always pick up the steady state with the bad environmental quality, even if for some
time their preferences change and place a more important emphasis on the environment.
Therefore, in societies that are characterized by a sort of short spurts of environmental
support, or those that act only due to pressing needs, we will also observe relatively low
long-term levels of environmental quality. In contrast, in societies that are built upon a
stronger connection towards the environment we will see that environmental quality will
be allowed to grow to a relatively high long-run level, even if the society were to change
its preferences to one with a lower emphasis on environmental quality if the state of the
environment is very high.
We now deal with the last, somewhat more complicated case, where the preference
threshold has an intermediate level. This leads to less clear-cut results.
Case III (intermediate threshold): EL < Ê < EH.
In this case we can quite easily show that neither EH nor EL will turn out to be a
steady state. From equation (7), if θt−1 = θt = θL ( which means Et ≥ Ê, for any t)
then we obtain EL = θLκ
1
1−α . Hence, EL ≥ Ê. Similarly, if θt−1 = θt = θH ( which
means Et ≤ Ê, for any t), then EH = θHκ 11−α . Therefore, EH ≤ Ê ≤ EL. However,
in the intermediate threshold case we have that EL < Ê < EH , which is equivalent to
θLκ
1
1−α > Ê > θHκ
1
1−α . The above is true if and only if θL > θH , which however contradicts
our Assumption 1 that θL < θH . Thus, we conclude that EL and EH cannot be steady
states in the intermediate threshold case.
Intuitively, what we would expect now is the following. For a high level of environ-
mental quality, such that Et > Ê, a society will place little relative importance on the
environment as environmental quality is, in its eyes, sufficiently high. Thus, capital accu-
mulation will be increased in order to have a larger consumption when old, which directly
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leads to a lower level of abatement and consequently a reduction in environmental quality.
This reduction will continue until environmental quality passes the threshold at which so-
ciety suddenly notices that the environment is strongly degraded and starts to place more
emphasis on abatement and the recovery of environmental quality. Given the assumption
of EL < Ê < EH , the society, due to its preferences being more strongly directed to the
environment11, now targets a high level of environmental quality (given by EH). How-
ever, having reached a sufficiently high level of environmental quality, and thereby having
passed the threshold, the society now feels that it had placed too much relative emphasis
on the environment and returns to its previous pollution-intensive behavior.
Following this logic implies that we should expect no convergence to a single point,
but society will be caught in an endless feedback loop where preferences that are more
strongly directed towards the environment lead to a higher environmental quality. This
eventually leads to a crossing of the threshold, which induces lower relative preferences
directed towards the environment, which in return leads to a reduction in environmental
quality again. We now present the analytical underpinnings of this intuitive description.
Proposition 3 Suppose that θLκ
1
1−α < Ê < θHκ
1
1−α , then for any p ∈ N and p ≥ 2,
there exists a p−cycle for the dynamic equation (7) and the threshold conditions θt = θL
if Et ≤ Ê and θt = θH if Et < Ê.
Proof 3 The logic of the proof is the following. We first provide the argument and con-
dition under which a 2-cycle may occur, then the conditions under which a 3-cycle may
occur, and then conclude on the existence of a p-cycle.
Suppose that at t− 1, Et−1 > Ê, then we consequently have θt−1 = θL; while at period
t, Et < Ê, and hence society will pick up θt = θH . That yields Et+1 = H(Et, θL, θH).
A 2-cycle would imply that Et+1 = Et−1 > Ê and, similarly, we would also have Et+2 =
H(Et+1, θH , θL) = Et < Ê. We now denote the two levels of environmental quality where
these conditions are satisfied as ELH = H(EHL, θL, θH) and EHL = H(ELH , θH , θL).
11This is, within this model, meant in the sense of a higher semi-elasticity of environmental quality in
utility.
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These two equilibrium points can then be written as
ELH =
θH
1 + θH
(
EHL + κ
(
EHL
θL
)α)
, (9)
EHL =
θL
1 + θL
(
ELH + κ
(
ELH
θH
)α)
. (10)
We claim that this system of equations gives one and only one positive solution. Indeed,
substituting ELH
θH
= 1
1+θH
(
EHL + κ
(
EHL
θL
)α)
into equation (10), it follows
EHL =
θL
1 + θL
[
θH
1 + θH
(
EHL + κ
(
EHL
θL
)α)
+
κ
(1 + θH)α
(
EHL + κ
(
EHL
θL
)α)α]
.
Or equivalently, we can rewrite the above as
EHL
(
1− θL
1 + θL
θH
1 + θH
)
=
θL
1 + θL
[
θH
1 + θH
κ
(
EHL
θL
)α
+
κ
(1 + θH)α
(
EHL + κ
(
EHL
θL
)α)α]
,
in which the left hand side is a straight line in term of EHL starting from 0 and goes to
∞, while the right hand side is a strictly increasing concave function, starting at zero.
Thus, we can prove that there is one and only one positive solution EHL which satisfies
the above equation. The same obviously holds for ELH .
As a byproduct, and based on the above notation, we have the following.
Corollary 1 Suppose that θLκ
1
1−α < Ê < θHκ
1
1−α , then it follows that
EHL < Ê < ELH . (11)
Consequently, this pair of equations forms a stable 2−cycle. Following a similar logic
as above, we can prove the existence of a 3-cycle. For this we have to distinguish two
cases, which depend on the relative position of the threshold.
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In Case I we assume that at time t − 1 and t, we have Et−1 > Ê and Et > Ê, while
at t+ 1, we have Et+1 < Ê. Moreover, the following dynamics hold
Et+2 = G(Et+1, θt, θt+1) = G(Et+1, θL, θH) = Et−1,
Et+1 = G(Et, θt−1, θt) = G(Et, θL, θL) = Et−2,
Et = G(Et−1, θt−2, θt−1) = G(Et−1, θH , θL) = Et−3.
(12)
Thus, the 3-cycle is defined by
Et+2 = Et−1, Et+1 = Et−2, Et = Et−3,
and in short, we use the following notations:
EHLH = G(ELLL, θL, θH), ELLL = G(ELHL, θL, θL), ELHL = G(EHLH , θH , θL).
The 3-cycle is then the solution of the following system
EHLH =
θH
1+θH
(
ELLL + κ
EαLLL
θαL
)
,
ELLL =
θL
1+θL
(
ELHL + κ
EαLHL
θαL
)
,
ELHL =
θL
1+θL
(
EHLH + κ
EαHLH
θαH
)
.
(13)
The unique positive solution of this system, which can be demonstrated in the same way
as in the case of the 2-cycle, generates a 3-cycle.
Using a similar argument we have the second case.
In Case II we have that at time t − 1 and t, there is Et−1 < Ê and Et < Ê, but at
t+ 1, it yields Et+1 > Ê. Moreover, the following dynamics hold
Et+2 = G(Et+1, θt, θt+1) = G(Et+1, θH , θL) = Et−1,
Et+1 = G(Et, θt−1, θt) = G(Et, θH , θH) = Et−2,
Et = G(Et−1, θt−2, θt−1) = G(Et−1, θL, θH) = Et−3.
(14)
and thus the 3-cycle is defined similarly to above as
Et+2 = Et−1, Et+1 = Et−2, Et = Et−3,
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Thus, using a similar notation
ELHL = G(EHHH , θH , θL), EHHH = G(EHLH , θH , θH), EHLH = G(ELHL, θL, θH),
by the same arguments we obtain a 3-cycle. In a similar vain we can derive a p−cycle,
for any p ≥ 2. That completes the proof. 
In the following, we study the domain of the potential cycles. This result is summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose that θLκ
1
1−α < Ê < θHκ
1
1−α , then any Et converges to a p−cycle
and stays between EL and EH .
Proof 4 See Appendix. 
It is, unfortunately, not possible to derive which frequency of cycle we should expect
under what parameter conditions. Indeed, given the fact that there are infinitely many
p−cycles, then, as shown above, each Et ∈ (EL, EH) is linked to one cycle. Consequently,
for EL < Eˆ < EH , if Et ∈ (EL, EH), then we are already on a p-cycle.
Thus, it is impossible to know whether preferences change every generation, which
would be the case in a 2-cycle, or whether it takes several generations for the preferences
to change, which would be the case of a cycle of higher order.
This result is the crucial difference to John and Pecchenino, and the role of the thresh-
old becomes the most obvious. Consequently, what is important to take away is the fact
that this threshold in preferences can induce cycles if the threshold is neither too high
nor too low. Knowing the order of the cycles would be useful for empirical testing. Apart
from that, however, the result that cycles can occur - independent of knowing their order
- has implications for intergenerational equity.
In terms of intergenerational equity, the results that we obtain here follow the same
argument as outlined in Schumacher and Zou (2008). Basically, these cycles may induce a
violation of standard criteria of intergenerational equity, e.g. non-decreasing utility. And,
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in contrast to the common argument that climate change or environmental destruction
may lead to a violation of intergenerational equity in the distant future, we conclude that
violations are possible already in the near future. As a consequence, this gives rise to
policy interventions that help in avoiding the violations in intergenerational equity, which
we discuss in section 5 after having gone over some points related to the robustness of the
model.
4 Robustness
In this section we show under which circumstances this economy would converge to the
Point of Destruction (Et → 0). Also, we discuss the role of a natural regeneration rate as
well as the implication of our assumption κ > 0.
In section 3.1 we defined the ‘Point of Destruction’ as the level of the environment
where environmental quality is equal to zero. Intuitively, it is the level at which disaster
occurs and life on earth becomes unsustainable. Mathematically we defined this level to
be Et+i = 0, ∀i ≥ 1, if Et − βct + γAt ≤ 0. From the previous analysis we know that
the only way in which we may have Et = 0 as a steady state solution is if the marginal
utility of environmental quality becomes negligible small for agents’ decisions. This occurs
only for θL = 0. However, this only insures that the Point of Destruction may actually
be a potential equilibrium point. The point is that, for any Eˆ > 0, preferences change
and the new preference parameter becomes θH . Consequently, the only way in which
environmental quality may actually approach zero requires a combination of conditions.
From the maximization problem we can easily show that, for θL = 0, At = 0. Thus,
Et+1 = Et − βwt. Consequently, we require that Eˆ is sufficiently low, meaning if there
∃i > 0, such that Ei − βwi ≤ 0, then we require Eˆ ∈ (0, Ei). As a result, convergence to
the Point of Destruction is really a result of an extreme case that furthermore requires a
sufficient myopia.
We can generalize this result. For example, we may assume a natural regeneration rate
along the lines of Jouvet et al. (2005) and suggest that the evolution of environmental
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quality is described by
Et+1 = E˜ +m(Et − E˜)− βct + γAt, (15)
where m ∈ (0, 1) is the speed at which the environment returns to its natural state E˜ > 0.
In this case we require a third condition for environmental quality to converge to the
Point of Destruction, namely that the natural regeneration mEt must be smaller than the
total amount of pollution. Within our notation this turns out to be mEt < (1− α)βkαt .
There is another condition that would lead environmental quality to converge to the
Point of Destruction. It is given by κ < 0. In this case, the effective share of wages
spent on abatement is smaller than the total amount of pollution that arises from the
consumption activities. In this case, equation (7) predicts that environmental quality
will necessarily decrease over time and converge to the Point of Destruction. Thus, the
model would essentially predict a destruction of the environment, no matter where the
threshold is located and how strongly preferences are directed towards the environment.
This, obviously, is a weakness of modeling without a natural regeneration rate and with
log-utility. However, this weakness is only relevant if κ < 0. Also, the assumption of a
sufficiently high regeneration rate m > 0 would then allow for a positive steady state in
environmental quality. It would, nevertheless, draw away attention from the importance
of the threshold, which clearly comes as an important driver of dynamics within our
current model setting.
5 Policy making
For this policy analysis we focus on the role of the threshold, since this is the main
contribution of our work. We start of by studying inhowfar the threshold affects society’s
indirect utility. We then present a method with which policies can be compared even
though preferences are endogenous. Then we analyze a potential way in which a policy
maker can shift society to the steady state with higher indirect utility. We distinguish
between costless policies and those that are costly and compare those that are financed
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via an income tax with those that are financed through a lump-sum tax.
5.1 Costless policies
We want to know which society is better off in terms of indirect utility, namely the one
with a high threshold of environmental quality or the one with a lower one. We can solve
for this as follows. From the two dynamic equations (4) and (6), it is easy to see that the
two steady states of capital and consumptions are given by, for i = L,H,
ki =
Ei
γθi
=
κ
1
1−α
γ
, ci =
RiEi
γθi
= α
(
Ei
γθi
)α
= αkαi =
ακ
α
1−α
γα
.
Indirect utility (3), for i = L,H, at steady state is then given by
Ui = ln(ci) + θi ln(Ei) = ln
(
ακ
α
1−α
γα
)
+ θi ln(θiκ
1
1−α ),
which is a strictly increasing convex function of θi.
Result 1 The position of the threshold determines indirect utility since it determines the
level of environmental quality at steady state.
In terms of policy making, Result 1 implies that if the threshold exceeds EH , then this
leads to the highest indirect utility at steady state. In contrast, for the threshold below
EL, we conclude that indirect utility at steady state will be the lowest.
12 This suggests
that, if there are means of affecting this threshold, there could be a potential role for
policy interventions. Let us assume a policy maker can freely choose Eˆ. This would, for
example be a reasonable assumption in case the threshold arises due to environmental
standards that are based on health assessments. Then the question would be: Under
what circumstances would a policy maker want to set Eˆ to Eˆ > EH? We know that
indirect utility at steady state under Eˆ ≥ EH is higher than under Eˆ < EH . However,
this is due to the discrete preference change whenever E passes the threshold. Here
12This holds obviously only if we do not converge to the Point of Destruction.
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we enter the territory described by Marshak (1978), where public policy directly shapes
preferences or tastes. Marshak questions this kind of policy intervention on the grounds
that (p.386) “if one continues to believe that even in a world of changeable tastes the
foundation for policy and prediction has to be a theory of individual rational choice, then
one risks turning Economic Man into a complex monster of calculated schizophrenia, who
chooses or manipulates future mutations of himself.” Consequently, as many economists
would argue, if preferences change, then an intrapersonal comparison may be meaningless
and the evaluation of a policy impossible. Nevertheless, a policy evaluation is possible if
all possible future selfs were to hold the same qualitative opinion on the policy. These
future selfs are: agent A, who has the new preferences and prefers the {c, E} bundle
obtained based on those new preferences; agent B, who holds the old preferences but
would prefer the {c, E} bundle obtained based on the new preferences. For a clear-cut
case, let us assume that, initially, Eˆ < EL. The policy maker has now the possibility
to raise Eˆ (e.g. by changing the environmental standard) free of charge. We argue here
that this policy should be undertaken if u(θL, c(θH), E(θH)) > u(θL, c(θL), E(θL)), and if
u(θH , c(θH), E(θH)) > u(θH , c(θL), E(θL)). In this case, all possible future selfs are better
off and the policy is worthwhile to undertake. We now evaluate these cases in turn.
Agent A compares u(θH , c(θH), E(θH)) > u(θH , c(θL), E(θL)). Substituting the respec-
tive optimal solutions at the steady state values gives
ln
((
αEH
γθH
)α)
+ θH lnEH > ln
((
αEL
γθL
)α)
+ θH lnEL.
Simplifying gives
EH > EL.
This holds by assumption. Thus, agent A is better off if the policy is undertaken.
Agent B evaluates u(θL, c(θH), E(θH)) > u(θL, c(θL), E(θL)). This gives rise to
ln
((
αEH
γθH
)α)
+ θL lnEH > ln
((
αEL
γθL
)α)
+ θL lnEL.
Substituting leads again to the condition EH > EL. Consequently, both agents prefer that
the policy is undertaken. In this case, one can argue that there are reasonable grounds
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for policy intervention, and that this policy intervention should be designed in such a
way that the threshold takes the highest possible (or highest necessary) level in order
to assure convergence to the high steady state. The same reasoning applies to the case
where Eˆ ∈ (EL, EH). It is clear from the results in the previous section that in this case
indirect utility cycles between UH and UL, and as a result it is still worthwhile for the
policy maker to set Eˆ ≥ EH .
5.2 Income tax
The previous policy result rests on the assumption that it is costless to change threshold
Eˆ. While one could assume this to be true for a policy that sets health standards or
alike, it is unlikely for thresholds that arise due to e.g. cultural dynamics. In this case,
educational measures are helpful in driving public opinion. However, these tend to be
costly (this is, e.g., the case in Prieur and Bre´chet 2013). As a result, one could ask:
What would be the maximum willingness to pay in order to set Eˆ to Eˆ > EH? Our
comparison here will be again between the cases where Eˆ < EL and where the policy
maker wants to change Eˆ to Eˆ > EH .
Assume the policy maker raises an income tax τ which then pays for the change in
the threshold. Since educational achievements are also subject to full depreciation during
the course of a lifetime, this educational expenditure needs to be undertaken in every
generation. Hence, the dynamic equation (7) changes to
Et+1 =
θt
1 + θt
[
Et + ((1− α)γ(1− τ)− αβ)
(
Et
γθt−1
)α]
. (16)
The high steady state will then be given byEH(τ) = θHκ(τ)
1
1−α , where κ(τ) ≡ (1−α)γ(1−τ)−αβ
γα
.
Consequently, indirect utility differences at steady state between UL and UH give the max-
imum willingness to pay to shift Eˆ above EH , which is given by
Ω(τ) ≡ ln
(
ακ(τ)
α
1−α
γα
)
+ θH ln
(
θHκ(τ)
1
1−α
)
− ln
(
ακ
α
1−α
γα
)
− θL ln
(
θLκ
1
1−α
)
. (17)
The maximum feasible level of τ is given by τ¯ = κ
(1−α)γ1−α . Function Ω(τ) has the following
shape. For τ = 0, we have Ω(τ) = θH ln(θHκ
1
1−α )− θL ln(θLκ 11−α ) > 0, while Ω(τ¯) = −∞.
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Then, the derivative of Ω with respect to τ is
∂Ω(τ)
∂τ
= − (θH + α)γ
(1− α)γ(1− τ)− αβ = −
(θH + α)γ
1−α
κ(τ)
< 0.
As a result, the maximum willingness to pay for shifting Eˆ ≥ EH is given by τmax, where
τmax is defined by Ω(τmax) = 0.
In the light of the motivational part, and with the specific mechanism of environmental
laws and standards in mind, then we may conclude from this that it is better to tighten
laws and require tougher standards, since this would increase the threshold Eˆ and con-
sequently increase the likelihood of converging to the high steady state and high indirect
utility.
If the policy that changes the threshold is costly and if this policy is paid via a
percentage income tax, then raising the threshold has the consequence that it also lowers
the steady state in environmental quality. This arises since a part of income that otherwise
could go towards abatement is being used up by the government to finance the raising of
the threshold. As a result, indirect utility at steady is lowered (with respect to the status
quo EH) the more the policy maker has to tax the agents.
5.3 Lump-sum tax
Instead of an income tax a policy maker could also introduce a lump-sum tax. In this
case, the wage constraint is modified and now reads
wt − τt = st + At,
where τt ≥ 0 is the lump-sum tax. We assume that the agent takes the lump-sum tax
as given when choosing the optimal allocations, and the policy maker chooses the tax
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afterwards.13 As a result, this modifies the dynamic equation (7), which now becomes
Et+1 =
θt
1 + θt
[
Et + κ
Eαt
θα−1t
− γτt
]
.
In this case we find the steady state characterized by equation
E = κθ1−αi E
α − γθiτ, i = L,H. (18)
We assume again that the policy maker only introduces the tax if this helps in raising the
threshold such that the preference parameter θH applies and if indirect utility increases.
As a result of this tax, we notice that the steady state level of environmental quality
decreases, and so does next period’s level of the environment. This happens since the tax
works as a reduction to wages such that net wages available to finance both savings and
abatement expenditure are lower.
From equation (18), we see that the left-hand side is a linear function of E and the
right hand side, g(E; τ) = κθ1−αH E
α − γθHτ , is an increasing and concave function in E
while it decreases in τ . If τ = 0, we revert to the previous case where the steady states
depend on the position of the threshold relative to the steady states EL and EH . If τ > 0,
the right hand side g(E; τ) decreases and there exists a τ > 0, such that,
(a) if 0 < τ < τ , there are two positive steady state: El(τ) and Eh(τ) with El(τ) <
Eh(τ) < EH .
(b) at τ = τ , there is one positive steady state Ew(τ) < EH , located at E
l(τ) <
Ew(τ) < Eh(τ) < EH .
(c) if τ > τ , there is no steady state.
We can now demonstrate the following results.
Proposition 5 For τ ∈ (0, τ), the steady state El(τ) is unstable while Eh(τ) is a stable
steady state. For τ ≥ τ , the system converges to the Point of Destruction.
13This approach is related to the political-economy equilibrium and developed in e.g. (Glomm and
Ravikumar 1997) and applied in (Prieur and Bre´chet 2013). However, we do not solve for the optimal
tax but instead show what a tax could achieve or lead to.
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Proof 5 Define
G(Et; τ) =
θt
1 + θt
[
Et + κ
Eαt
θα−1t
− γτ
]
which is strictly increasing and concave in E. Thus, the slope of G(Et; τ) is given by
∂G
∂E
> 0. In the case where there are two steady states, that is, τ ∈ (0, τ), at the lower
steady state, G(E; τ) must cross the 45−degree line from below, since G(0; τ) < 0. Thus,
∂G(El(τ))
∂E
> 1, implying that the steady state El(τ) is unstable. Similarly, at steady state
Eh(τ), G(E; τ) must cross the 45−degree line from above, that is, ∂G(Eh(τ))
∂E
< 1. Combin-
ing this with ∂G
∂E
> 0, we conclude that the steady state Eh(τ) is stable. 
If a policy maker introduces a lump-sum tax, then this thus has the consequence of
introducing a trap. For too low wages, or too high taxes, a given lump-sum tax will
lead to convergence to the Point of Destruction for E0 < E
l(τ). As a result, the danger
associated with this policy may outweigh the benefits if there is uncertainty around the
effectiveness of the policy and the level of environmental quality relative to El(τ).
Corollary 2 The steady states under the lump-sum tax are ordered according to El(τ) <
Ew(τ) < Eh(τ) < EH , for any τ ∈ (0, τ), while EL < Eh(τ) if τ <
(
(θL/θH)
α − θL/θH
)
κ
1
1−α
γ
.
Also, EL < E
l(τ) if τ >
(
(θL/θH)
α − θL/θH
)
κ
1
1−α
γ
and θH/θL > α
1
α−1 . Else, EL > E
h(τ).
Proof 6 We define Γ(Ej) ≡ κθ1−αH Eαj − γθHτ − Ej, for j = l, h. Then evaluating Γ(Ej)
at EL and solving for τ gives the desired results. The last condition comes from noticing
that whether the slope of κθ1−αH E
α
j − γθHτ is greater or smaller than one when evaluated
at EL implies whether EL is smaller than E
l(τ) or larger than Eh(τ). 
Consequently, for a sufficiently high θH/θL ratio, we may have the result that EL < E
l(τ).
In this case a policy that raises a lump-sum tax when environmental quality is below El(τ),
or Et < E
l(τ), in order to shift the threshold above El(τ), will induce convergence to the
Point of Destruction based on Proposition 5. As a result, this policy should only be
applied when environmental quality is sufficiently high, such that the stable steady state
Eh(τ) will be approached.
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If we take the high steady state Eh(τ), then consumption is given by
ch = α(kh)α =
α
γα
(Eh)α
θαH
.
Thus the steady state utility is Uh = ln(ch)+θH ln(E
h) and the willingness to pay to shift
Ê to be above Eh is given by
Λ(τ) = Uh − UL = ln
(
α
γαθαH
)
+ (α + θH) ln(E
h)− UL,
where UL is independent of τ .
This gives
Λ(0) = UH − UL > 0, ∂Λ(τ)
∂τ
= (α + θH)
∂Eh
∂τ
< 0.
Thus, there exists a τ > 0, such that Λ(τ) = 0.
As a result, the maximum willingness to pay to shift Ê > Eh is given by τLS = τ ,
for τLS < τ . Though the arguments are similar to the above income-tax case, the results
differ.
Conclusively, when we thus look at our three potential policies that may shift the
threshold (costless, percent income tax or lump-sum tax), we have shown that each has
its own advantages and limitations. We have also argued that, in terms of policy choice,
it is important to know which mechanism leads to the existence of the threshold. In
some cases the threshold is more likely to occur through government regulation, like it
is the case for ozone standards. In other cases, like the attitude towards nuclear energy,
thresholds are more likely to occur due to cultural dynamics or median voter outcomes.
6 Conclusion
In this article we studied the implication of thresholds in preferences. To model this
we extended the basic model of John and Pecchenino by allowing the current level of
environmental quality to have a discrete impact on how an agent trades off future con-
sumption and environmental quality. We motivate the existence of the threshold based
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on research from political science, from arguments based on regulation and standards,
cultural economics as well as ecological economics.
Our results are that the location of the threshold determines both the potential steady
states as well as the dynamics. For low thresholds, as it would be the case in consumption-
oriented societies, we find that environmental quality converges to a low steady state.
In contrast, if the threshold is sufficiently high, which would hold in postmaterialistic
societies, then environmental quality converges to a high steady state. For intermediate
levels of the threshold we find that environmental quality converges to a stable p-cycle,
with environmental quality being asymptotically bounded below and above by the low
and high steady state. This thus has implications for intergenerational equity, since we
can show that, even in the near future, standard criteria of intergenerational equity are
violated.
We then draw several policy implications at steady state. Importantly, we discuss
under which circumstances policy interventions are useful despite this endogeneity in
preferences. The policy intervention that we look at is a shift in the threshold. Our
criteria for a potential policy intervention is that, if each individual in every potential
state of the world would be better off by the policy intervention, then the policy should
be undertaken. Our results are that, if it is costless to shift the threshold, then it is always
worthwhile to do so. This has implications for the setting of environmental standards. In
case a standard needs to be imposed, our results indicate that it is always better to set the
standard at a higher level than a lower one. This, obviously, rests on the assumption that
it is costless to set the standard. In contrast, if it is costly to change the threshold, e.g.
in case educational measures need to be undertaken, then it is worthwhile to change the
threshold if the threshold originally was very low. In that case, it is certainly important
to know more precisely about the costs and benefits involved in changing the threshold,
and the policy would be case-specific. For example, we have shown that in the case of a
lump-sum tax, a policy maker could essentially create a development trap. The results
in this article suggest that only richer societies should consider applying a lump-sum tax
since otherwise they may be caught in the development trap.
36
In terms of future research, we suggest to extend this work to a long-term planner.
This is difficult in so far as the modeling in this case is not clear. Firstly, one would imagine
that an infinitely-lived planner sets the threshold high enough so that convergence to the
steady state is assured. In this case, our previous results are unlikely to carry forward to
the infinitely-lived planner case. However, one could also imagine that the planner cannot
choose the threshold, e.g. if it arises due to cultural dynamics that he views outside of
his control. In this case the change in preferences whenever environmental quality crosses
the threshold is difficult to deal with analytically. Consequently, whether the results from
our article carry forward to the infinitely-lived planner case depends on how much power
or freedom one gives to the planner.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 4.
To understand the idea and logic of the proof, we start with the 2−cycle, then we finish
the proof with the general p−cycle.
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Step 1. Suppose that θLκ
1
1−α < Ê < θHκ
1
1−α and suppose that a 2−cycle appears,
then it follows that
EL < EHL < Eˆ < ELH < EH . (19)
Proof. From the definition of 2-cycle, we have
ELH =
θH
1 + θH
(
EHL + κ
(
EHL
θL
)α)
, (20)
EHL =
θL
1 + θL
(
ELH + κ
(
ELH
θH
)α)
. (21)
Substituting EHL into eq. (20) gives
ELH =
θH
1 + θH
[
θL
1 + θL
(
ELH + κ
(
ELH
θH
)α)
+
κ
θαL
(
θL
1 + θL
(ELH + κ
(
ELH
θH
)α)α]
≡ Ω(ELH).
The left-hand side is a linear function in ELH , while the right-hand side is a concave
function starting at zero. The solution to this equation is where the linear left-hand side
crosses the concave right-hand side. This defines ELH . Then if Ω(EH)−EH < 0, we know
that EH > ELH . Thus, substituting EH into the equation above gives, after simplifying,
the condition
− 1
1 + θL
[
1− (1 + θL)
α−1
(1 + θH)α−1
]
< 0.
This holds under assumption θH > θL.
The proof for EHL > EL proceeds along the same line.
Step 2. Now let us demonstrate that this is actually true for any p−cycle.
Indeed, for any p−cycle, if Et > Ê, then eventually we have that Et+τ < Ê for some
τ ≥ 1. At that moment the preferences change and eventually, we will have Et+τ+i > Ê
for some i ≥ 1. The question is whether Et+τ+i > EH . We shall consider different cases
based on the difference equation (7).
Case I. Et < Ê and Et−1 < Ê while Et+1 > Ê.
In this case, θt−1 = θH and θt = θH , thus, the difference equation (7) is
Et+1 =
θH
1 + θH
[
Et + κ
(
Et
θH
)α]
.
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Given the assumption that Et+1 > Ê, we could take xEt+1 = Et with 0 < x < 1 and
hence,
Et+1 =
θH
1 + θH
[
xEt+1 + κ
(
xEt+1
θH
)α]
≡ ψ(Et+1).
If we can prove that ψ(EH)− EH < 0, then we must have Et+1 < EH , given Et+1 is the
unique solution of the difference equation where the right hand side is strictly concave in
Et+1.
It is easy to check that ψ(EH) < EH if and only if
x+
κxαEα−1H
θα−1H
< 1 +
1
θH
,
which is equivalent to
x+
xα
θH
< 1 +
1
θH
.
The last inequality is always true due to the fact that 0 < x < 1.
Case II Et−1 < Ê, Et > Ê and Et+1 > Ê.
In this case θt−1 = θH while θt = θL, thus the difference equation at t+ 1 is
Et+1 =
θL
1 + θL
[
Et + κ
(
Et
θH
)α]
<
θH
1 + θH
[
Et + κ
(
Et
θH
)α]
< EH ,
where the first inequality is strict since θL < θH and the last inequality comes from Case
I.
Case III Et−1 > Ê, Et > Ê and Et+1 > Ê.
In this situation, we have θt−1 = θt = θL. Thus we get the difference equation
Et+1 =
θL
1 + θL
[
Et + κ
(
Et
θL
)α]
.
(III.a) If Et ≤ Et+1, assume xEt+1 = Et with 0 < x < 1. Then, the above difference
equation is
Et+1 =
θL
1 + θL
[
xEt+1 + κ
(
xEt+1
θL
)α]
≡ ψ(Et+1).
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Similar to the Case I arguments that if we can prove that ψ(EH)−EH < 0, then we must
have Et+1 < EH .
It is easy to check that ψ(EH) < EH if and only if
θL
1 + θL
[
xθH +
xαθαH
θαL
]
< θH ,
which is equivalent to
xθL +
xαθα−1H
θα−1L
< 1 + θL.
The last inequality is always true due to the fact that θL < θH and 0 < x < 1.
(III.b) Suppose Et > Et+1 > Ê.
Then we only need to consider the upper bound of Et. Apply the same arguments
as in Case I and Case II for Et, we can show that Et < EH , except in the case where
Et−2 > Ê and Et−1 > Ê and Et−1 > Et; then we consider Et−1, and continue this process
until at one step t− τ + 1 for some τ ≥ 1 and where Et−τ−1 < Ê and Et−τ > Ê. However,
this is Case II and we have shown Et−τ+1 < EH . Hence, Et−τ+2 < Et−τ+1 < EH , and so
on, we have Et < EH .
That completes the proof. 
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